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The most dangerous lies are truths but slightly distorted
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Introduction
Philosophers usually do not ‘philosophize’ in separation from an ideo-
logy that is built into a political activity, which – in turn – is embedded
in the given time and environment of their lives. The dignity of philosophy,
and any other science, consists in an overall, undistorted constructing of an
image of the reality, with the inclusion of the role of human being who learns
about this reality, including that of a participant in the political life. In this
context, we can say about reliable cognizance of reality. What is it? It is:
• searching for the truth,
• nearing the truth, and
• discovering the truth.
Without reference to the truth, acquiring the reliable knowledge about
the world, as well as passing on such a knowledge in the process of lan-
guage communication become mendacious, or even impossible. Righteous
approaching the truth “opens the eye to injustice in the state and in the pri-
vate life” – Plato wrote in his autobiographic Letter (VII 324 b), on the basis
of his personal experience acquired in the course of his active political life.
Arriving at the truth and convincing in favour of the truth, in various
spheres of life, has been one of the most important principles of life and
dealing in science. This classical, universal, moral virtue devalues through
the following phenomena, which are omnipresent today:
• widespread neglect of agreeing on the meaning of a word,
• lack of responsibility for consequences of uttering words with no
publicly-established meaning,
• distorting the truth,
• evident lies.
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These phenomena violate the care of the adequacy of representation of
knowledge about the objective reality, as well as that of building a faithful
linguistic reﬂection of the knowledge and also its correct transfer and the
care of convincing in favour of the truth.
The art of language-based convincing which deals with political is-
sues always brushes against the problemate of the truth and the lie.
On the political scene there is a ﬁght going on not only for power, but
also for the truth. By means of political rhetoric (and not merely political
one) it is possible to pass both the truth and the falseness in the process
of language-based communication. When the sender’s intention, in the act
of communication, is to lie to the receiver, to pass false information to the
latter, using persuasion, the former creates all sorts of impressions of telling
the truth: he has to take into account what the receiver of the information
knows and also what the former is ready to accept as plausible; he renders
information in a certain order, in compliance with language rules of passing
information, still – however – he infringes the rules of conversation pro-
posed by H. P. Grice (1975)1 and ethics of acts of communication by means
of speech.
The main task of this work is not to determine the bases for a moral
evaluation of the lie; neither is it to describe its negative qualiﬁcation. We
are interested rather in the very problemate of the truth and the lie
itself, considered as a juxtaposition of two of its notions: the truth and the lie,
one that aims to provide a positive – as it would seem obvious – answer to
the question contained in the title of the present work:
Does the lie contradict the truth?
Will we, however, really obtain an obvious answer? A positive one?
The very motto itself in the opening of the work raises certain doubts:
Maybe the lie does not contradict the truth at all?
And if we add that a lie is often regarded as not only useful or necessary,
but also even as a virtue of contemporary civilization, as a new principle
of life, a “new truth”, then there may arise even new doubts. Is it, by
any chance, possible that the foundations of a moral evaluation of the lie
have changed and maybe this new “quality” is beginning to constitute such
a quality for the coming times as the supreme value, that is the truth, makes
1 It is violation, in particular, of the so-called maxim of quality, which reads (see
Tokarz, M. (1993), p. 220): “Do not oﬀer views about whose falseness you are convinced,
nor even views for which you do not hold suﬃcient justiﬁcation”.
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for opponents of all sophistry? And if, moreover, one adds that, after all,
many of us could learn ourselves that a liar – against his intention – can
tell the truth, then does there exist any explicit satisfying answer to the
questions posed above?
The considerations presented in this work are an attempt at giving an
answer to the arising doubts: it is obvious to philosophers and logicians that
such considerations must be grounded on a relevant conception of the truth
and the lie, on bringing up one of the most diﬃcult and disturbing philo-
sophical problems, that is the problemate of the truth, on investigating
what the lie is. The confusion about the notions related to the ambiguous
terms of “the truth” and “the lie” introduces, in turn, a confusion connected
with attempts at answering the questions posed.
Thus, in the ﬁrst part of this paper, we will deal with the very notion
itself, or – more precisely – with the notions of the truth; in the second one
– with the notions of the lie, and in the third part – we will juxtapose the
notions of the truth and the lie in such a way that in each case it should
be possible to provide an answer to the question asked in the title of the
work. Part four, being the ﬁnal one, contains certain summary of it, as well
as ﬁnal considerations as a peculiar challenge.
1. On the truth2
1.1. On the truth from the ancient perspective
and the contemporary history of philosophy and logic
The history of forming of the notion of ‘the truth’ had begun a long time
before philosophers and logicians took up the problem of the problemate
of the truth. “People who were communicating with one another wanted
to make sure that they were not deceived. After all the lie is one of the
most elementary means of manipulating the receiver of the message,” as
J. Werszowiec Płazowski and M. Szuwara write.3 And we know this, too.
People – while communicating with one another – as receivers of messages
– wanted not to be led astray, they wanted the messages to be carriers of
the truth. Thus, we cannot speak about the lie without making references
to the truth.
2 This part includes a discussion and reference to some themes considered in the
author’s earlier work entitled On Truth... (2009).
3 See: Werszowiec Płazowski, J., Szuwara, M. (2008), p. 111.
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What is the truth, however?
Can we speak about many kinds of the truth?
Does there exist one, commonly binding, objective truth?
These and similar questions have been asked from times immemorial.
These and similar questions – relating particularly to the aim of science,
philosophy, or to the sphere of ethical issues connected with ‘the truth’ have
troubled philosophers for over two and a half thousand years. We will ﬁrst
make a presentation of certain reﬂections concerning the understanding of
‘the truth’. Further in the work, we will juxtapose them with some reﬂexions
on the understanding of ‘the lie’.
It can be assumed that the contemporary ways of understanding of
‘the truth’ are connected with the traditional philosophical problem area
around this notion and that they have their source in the ancient Greek
philosophical thought, which gave raise to the beginning of the European
philosophy.
In the ancient Greece, philosophers, that is ‘lovers of wisdom’, reserved
to themselves the monopoly of truth; more exactly – searching for the truth
and wisdom. In the V–IV centuries B.C., on the territory of Greece, mainly
Athens, there were Sophists – travelling teachers of ‘wisdom’ and educators,
who – charging a fee – oﬀered education in the scope of subjects that were
useful both in an active public life and in the private one.4 Although they
did not create a uniform philosophical school, they worked out a style of new
rational thinking about the natural and social reality. They are considered to
be the ﬁrst humanists in the history of ancient philosophy, since the object
of their interest was life and human action, man. The Sophists regarded
the relativism of human cognition and of the whole knowledge, because this
is based on fallible perceptions of the senses. The truth is relative – the
Sophists claimed, it has the character of human supposing, which can be
– for our own purpose – freely shaped by means of argumentation, skilful
convincing to accept our own views. In the opinion of the Sophists, there
is not one, commonly binding and objective truth; there exist better (more
useful) and worse (less useful) truths. The choice of the better truth depends
on its higher usefulness, beneﬁt(s) it brings. Wise men are those who can
choose more useful truths and this not only in cognitive disciplines, but also
in the domains of ethics, religion, legal norms.5
4 See: Słownik kultury antycznej (A Dictionary of the Ancient Culture), Winniczuk, L.
(ed.) (1989), p. 483 ﬀ.; Szymanek, K. (2001), p. 293 ﬀ; Tatarkiewicz, W. (2001).
5 In this place and others that follow, we are quoting ample fragments of the author’s
work entitled On Truth... (2009), p. 26.
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It is this taking the relativistic view of the truth, the pragmatism of the
Sophists, the conditioning of justiﬁcation of the truth to a practical goal had,
with time, their consequences in the form of their abuse of science through
application of unreliable argumentation in justiﬁcations of the advocated
theses, making use of the so-called sophisms, i.e. skilful, seemingly correct
reasoning, which contains logical errors hidden in it on purpose.6
The attitude of the Sophists led to acknowledging the view that one
can announce two contradicting, yet true, sentences about every phenome-
non, about every thing. This, obviously, required proﬁciency and dexterity
in proving the theses which were propagated, false though they might be,
as well as in refuting the adversary’s theses. A lot of Sophists succumbed
to the temptation of teaching deceptive, twisting arguments that had little
to do with truth to rich Greek youngsters who wanted to make a political
career. This resulted in the fact that the word “Sophist” acquired a pejo-
rative meaning, the term being applied to the pseudo-educated people and
teachers of pseudo-wisdom, specialists in using far-fetched, though convin-
cing arguments. This notion of a Sophist has been in force until today.7
Socrates (469–399), counting as one of the most outstanding Ancient
thinkers, originated from the circle of Sophists.8 Opposing the science and
teaching of the Sophists, undertaking to ﬁght against their theses and seem-
ing truths, he claimed that
The truth is one, objective, commonly binding.
Socrates regarded dialogue as the only way of reaching the truth and
exposing it.9 He propagated the cult of the truth, acknowledged the existence
of the absolute good and the absolute truth. He also considered cognition
of the objective truth and leading people to learning the truth to be the
supreme ethical value. His teachings and methods that touched upon the
problem area of ethics and those of human life had a strong inﬂuence on his
disciples, among whom there were also politicians.
Socrates’ views, in particular those on the truth, which are known main-
ly thanks to Plato’s reports, have found their representation in the further
development of the philosophical and ethical thought, not only in the an-
cient times, but also during the Middle Ages and modern times. Various
6 Ibidem, p. 26.
7 Ibidem, pp. 26/27.
8 See: Krońska, I. (1985).




schools made references to the great thinker’s views throughout centuries,
many a time themselves being totally in opposition to one another and
understanding the truth in completely diﬀerent ways.
Both Plato – the founder of the famous philosophical school called
Plato’s Academy (which managed to function for as long as ten centu-
ries, until VI century BC) – and Aristotle (384–322), Plato’s disciple and
co-worker for many years, objected to cognitive relativism of the Sophists,
acknowledging the primacy of the truth about science (objective truth) and
ﬁghting against the rhetoric plied by the Sophists.
Aristotle – one of the greatest and the most versatile scientists of the
Ancient times – laid foundations under almost all domains of science. He
distinguished, in particular, logic, separating it from philosophy; he is also
called the “father” of formal logic. We owe to Aristotle the classical de-
ﬁnition of the truth in the cognitive sense, the deﬁnition that has been
around until today. The relative, utilitarian, truth, as well as the pragmatic
deﬁnition of the truth are replaced by the objective truth and Aristotelian
corresponding deﬁnition, according to which (putting it in brief):
The truth is an agreement of thoughts and things
which are the subject of the thoughts.10
In the formulation by St. Thomas of Aquinas
The truth is an agreement of the intellect with the state of things
consisting in that the intellect acknowledges the existence
of what there is, or non-existence of what there is not.
The classical Aristotelian deﬁnition of the truth makes the foundation of
contemporary semantic concept of the truth oﬀered by Alfred Tarski (1933),
the famous representative of the Warsaw School of Logic and then the Ca-
lifornian Logical School founded by the scholar. According to this concept,
the condition of adequacy (agreement) is preserved:
The sentence is true if and only if it is as the sentence states.
Let us go back, however, to our questions relating to the notion of ‘the
truth’:
Does there exist one, objective truth or are there many truths?
Answering the above question requires, without a doubt, pondering over
the very notion of ‘the truth’ itself. Since the question: “What, indeed, is the
10 On Truth..., op. cit., 28.
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truth?” which was asked in derision by the oﬃcial of the Roman Empire
– Pontius Pilate – while examining Jesus of Nazareth – if devoid of the
derision – is one of the most challenging and disturbing questions posed to
philosophers, and not only.
1.2. On the notions of the truth11
Truth (t) can be conceived as:
t1. an object of cognition, hence, substantially,
t2. a feature, property of descriptive sentences or logical judgments12
expressed by them or the cognition whose results are these judgments,
t3. all the sentences (all judgments) describing the broadly-conceived rea-
lity,
t4. a cognitive-ethical value,
t5. the truth relativized to the domain of knowledge,
t6. pragmatic truth.
In the case of t1, the word ‘truth’ is used as noun predicate, like in the
sentences below:
The fact that the lie has been in use since the times immemorial
is the truth.
The fact that the lie is often a tool of ﬁghting, especially of a political ﬁght,
is the truth.
or as an operator function in the following examples:
The truth is that the lie has been in use since the times immemorial.
The truth is that the lie is often a tool of ﬁghting,
especially of a political ﬁght.
Such a usage assumes that the truth is something existing, is an abstract
object, perceived with intellect as a set consisting of partial truths (in
the exemplary sentences the partial truth are the following facts: that the lie
was in use in the oldest times we know of and that the lie is often a tool of
ﬁghting, especially of a political ﬁght). The truth is then something one and
only which “can be discovered in an inﬁnite eﬀort of mankind”.13 The truth
11 Speaking about the notions of the truth, we apply here the approach accepted in
the papers by the author (2008, 2009). Still, for the use of the present paper we do not
analyze the notion of “the absolute truth” or the notion “absolute falseness” which stands
in opposition to the former, although all the notions of ‘the truth’ or ‘the lie’ discussed
in it can be framed as relevant explications of these “absolutistic” notions.
12 Logical judgments are meanings of sentences-types (cf. Reference 15). Thus, they
are not psychological judgments (certain thoughts) of individual people.
13 Agazzi, E. (1994), p. 292.
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conceived in this way is then a philosophical notion, an ontological one. One
can say then about the ontic truth.14
In the case of t2, the word “the truth” is used in its role of an adjective,
meaning that the truth is a property of sentences (or judgments correspond-
ing to them), which consists in their being true. Then the word “the truth”
is replaced by that of “truthfulness”, meaning certain property of descrip-
tive sentences treated as sentences-types.15 This usage assumes then the
existence of such sentences. We come to deal with them, for instance, in
utterances, like the ones below:
The sentence “The lie has already been in use since times immemorial”
is true.
The sentence “The lie is often a tool of ﬁghting, especially the political
ﬁght” is true.
The truth understood in this way is then a logical notion, a semantic
one. We speak then about the semantic notion of the truth. The truthfulness
of the sentence is here a property, the possession or a lack of possession of
which by the given sentence depends on whether between it (resp. what
it expresses – a thought, an opinion) and what it concerns – the broadly
conceived reality – holds a respective relation, within the framework pro-
posed by Aristotle, the classical one – agreement. The truthfulness of the
sentence is then an objective feature, it does not depend, in particular,
on whether we consider the sentence to be true according to some crite-
ria. The contradiction, negation, of the truth (truthfulness) is then falsehood
(falseness).
It must be observed here that the feature of truthfulness is attributed
not only to sentences or their thought-relating correspondents, or to cogni-
tion, whose results are true sentences; in the last case we can speak about
the epistemological truth. We speak about the truth also with reference to
somebody or something that is not a sentence, opinion, or cognition, using,
for instance, the expressions: “a true friend”, “true friendship”, “a true
love”, “a true work of art”, “true good”, “true freedom”, “a true doctrine”,
“a true theory”, “a true lie”, and the like. We use the word “true” then
in its secondary, not the primary meaning, having in mind realizations of
the essence of the object, its internal unity, harmony, agreement with some
ideal, a cultural pattern, a modelling idea, a model, criteria.
14 Philosophy recognizes also the notion of ontological truth.
15 Sentences-types are abstract objects, non-physical. They can be conceived as classes
of physical, concrete sentential inscriptions, in a sense identiﬁable, e.g. with respect to
their shape(see Wybraniec-Skardowska 1991).
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The truth, in the case of t3, is usually framed as the whole of sen-
tences (logical judgments) which are objectively true, thus – as carriers of
true cognition, propositions aptly, adequately describing the reality, that is
sentences possessing the feature of truthfulness. The truth is then an abs-
tract notion, an existing object, composed of all partial sentences-truths,
such as:
The lie has been in use already since times immemorial.
The lie is often a tool of ﬁghting, especially of the political ﬁght.
In the case of t4, we use the word “the truth” to denote what is good,
valuable, worthy of human cognition, what is an aim of human aspirations,
what is an axiological value. When we speak about “cognition of the objec-
tive truth”, the truth is framed as a supreme cognitive value. When we speak
about the purposefulness of “aspiring after the truth” and “propagating the
objective truth”, the truth has a moral value for us.
Does there exist a relation between the ontological, semantic, episte-
mological and axiological conception of the truth? Getting to know more
and more of new single partial truths (the ontic truth), we get to know also
true propositions (the semantic and epistemological truth) about the reality
which is of interest to us, and if searching for the truth (ontic or semantic),
propagation of the truth (true propositions), becoming acquainted with the
truth (with true statements) are the goal of our aspirations, the truth has
to us a cognitive-ethical value.
The word “the truth” in ontology, logical semantics, epistemology and
axiology has diﬀerent, though – in the above-mentioned framework – related
meanings.
It is often said, too, about diﬀerent truths in individual domains of
knowledge, treating them as laws or theorems of these sciences. Conceiving
the truth, as we have so far, in an abstract sense the scientiﬁc truth con-
sists of concrete laws, or theses of the given science, is the whole set of
theses or theorems of the given science, the whole of partial truths. We
come to deal then with the case of t.5 and a completely diﬀerent concep-
tion of the truth. The truth in these disciplines is established by means of
various methods of checking the truthfulness of judgments, according to
diﬀerent criteria. If, then, the meaning of the word “the truth” bears some
reference to criteria of the truth, and these can vary in diﬀerent domains
of knowledge, one sometimes says about diﬀerent kinds of truth, and even
about many truths, since there are a lot of sciences. Then, one generally
thinks about truths relativized to the given domain of science, e.g. ethics,
aesthetics, philosophy of language, theory of cognition, logic, physics, geo-
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metry, etc.16 If the criteria applied to establishing truths of science are
reliable and serve to better understand the examined reality, the truth –
then – has the scientiﬁc-cognitive value. Sometimes, however, the object
evidence, internal in relation to cognition and connected with the man-
ner in which the object of cognition (the state of things) is given to the
subject in the act of cognition, guaranteeing the truthfulness (faithful-
ness) of the cognitive result, is accepted as a well-justiﬁed eﬀective criterion
of the truth.17
Still, it needs to be clearly underlined that the criterion of the truth –
the basis according to which we recognize the truthfulness of cognition or
the conditions suﬃcient to acknowledge a sentence, a view or a conviction
(logical judgment) to be true – cannot be identiﬁed with the deﬁnition of
the truth, with the deﬁnition of an objectively true sentence. The classical
deﬁnition of the truth does not refer to any of its criteria. The deﬁnition
of a criterion was clearly diﬀerentiated by Bertrand Russell and Jan Łuka-
siewicz. It can be accepted, following Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, that accep-
tance of the classical deﬁnition of the truth allows eliminating the criterion
of the truth at all.18
In the case of t6., the truth is conceived in compliance with the prag-
matistic deﬁnition which makes the truthfulness of a sentence, a thesis,
dependent on some pragmatic criteria: usefulness in foreseeing and prac-
tical applications, convenience, economicality. The American pragmatists
of the 20th century (W. James, Ch. S. Peirce, J. Dewey) claimed that the
truthfulness of sentences or propositions is determined just by broadly-con-
ceived criteria of usability. Rejecting the classical deﬁnition of the truth
and – thus – acquisition of theses which make a stable basis of our know-
ledge, pragmatists make the truthfulness of sentences dependent on some
aims and actions, investing the truth with a relative character, and cog-
nition – with a relative one. Acknowledging the primacy of action over
thinking and practice over theory, pragmatists come closer to the stance
of the Sophists. The pragmatic truth is then composed of particular re-
lative truths which can be treated as those acknowledged by the prag-
matists as true.
We can raise objections with reference to the pragmatistic deﬁnition,
like to other non-classical deﬁnitions of truthfulness, that – to some extent
16 See: Agazzi, E. (1994), pp. 285–307.
17 See: Herbut, J. (ed.), Leksykon Filozofii Klasycznej (A Lexicon of the Classical Phi-
losophy), pp. 438 and 439.
18 Ajdukiewicz K. (1985), pp. 13–14.
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– it is justiﬁed by assuming the classical deﬁnition.19 Furthermore, as it was
mentioned earlier, the classical deﬁnition does not require making referen-
ces to any criteria of the truth. “The notion of truthfulness is a natural
and fundamental characteristic of science, diﬀerentiating science from other
creations of mental culture in the fullest manner”.20
The aim of science, philosophy, is to strive for cognition of the objec-
tive truth as this is what invests the latter with a cognitive value. The
Polish philosophers and logicians who were members of the world-famous
Lvov-Warsaw School, whose founder was Kazimierz Twardowski,21 strove
for the primacy of thinking, for the truth in science, and also in education
and politics, for maintaining the classical, Aristotelian, deﬁnition.
2. On the lie
2.1. The lie yesterday and today
We know that the lie has been in use since times immemorial. It is
rooted in our civilization and plays diﬀerent functions. It was and is applied
to enforce something or to reap some beneﬁt. It was often and still is a tool
or weapon of ﬁghting, especially in a political ﬁght, one in which a conﬂict
of interests or opinions comes to the fore, in which human thoughts, views
and struggles of intellectual, social, political spheres of life clash with one
another, a ﬁght targeted at entrapping or deceiving the opponent or society
through not telling the truth to the public or, at least, not the whole truth.
The past century, the 20th century, took over the lie which is generally
simple (a lie used while playing cards, a lie in the relations of sale-pur-
chase, etc.). Lies of the past and of the current, the 21st, century are ob-
viously more sophisticated and they are not simple lies, but frequently
twisting political games, games on the international arena, ones that are
shielded by accomplishments of contemporary civilization and commercial
mass media.
The lie has become inseparable not only from politics – it has attacked
all spheres of our lives. The modern lie has become insidious. Publicly and
popularly repeated – like a typical commercial – it is becoming an integral
part of our lives, not allowing us to perceive or come closer to the truth.
19 See: Leksykon, op. cit., p. 439.
20 Czeżowski, T. (1958a), p. 70.
21 A study devoted to this famous School was published by Jan Woleński in 1985
(English version in 1989).
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This is a result of the information policy in force. The diﬀerence between
the notions of the lie and the truth is getting blurred.
In this context, one can quote the well-known statement by the Minister
of Propaganda of the Third Reich – Joseph Goebbels – a close collaborator
of Adolf Hitler, who said:
“A lie that is repeated a thousand times becomes the truth”.
Does the lie which is referred to in the statement above, indeed, become
the truth? If so, what kind of truth? The objective truth? The latter is stable
and unchanging, independent of situations and contexts!
If the quoted sentence uttered by Goebbels were true, then the liar’s
paradox: On the truth-telling liar, well-known already in antiquity, could
perhaps be removed as well. After all, a liar could be truth-telling in fact,
since one cannot see a contradiction in that the liar, saying “I am lying!”,
is lying and is not (is telling the truth) at the same time,
because:
• if he is lying, then it is not so as he says, that is he is not lying, he is
telling the truth,
• if he is not lying, he is telling the truth, then it is as he says, he is lying.
Why, then, solving this paradox has caused many a sleepless night to
many a thinker for centuries?22
We can feel here that the chaos in the use of notions, connected with the
diﬀerent meanings of the words “the lie” and “the truth”, makes it diﬃcult
to formulate rational answers to the questions posed in the present work. It
is also felt justiﬁable to make a distinction between the notions of the lie,23
like we already did about the notions of the truth.
2.2. On the notions of the lie
One cannot say about the lie without making references to the truth.
Thus, we will refer the notions of ‘the lie’ to those of ‘the truth’.
The lie can be perceived as:
l1. an object, substantially,
a. of negation of cognition, or
b. of falsifying cognition;
22 Solving this ancient semantic paradox had not been possible – as it is well-known
– until the 20th century; the contradiction lies in not respecting the diﬀerentiation of
expressions of objective language from expressions of its metalanguage.
23 Detailed considerations relating to the notions of lie, from the perspective of logic,
are taken up by M. Tokarz (2006), pp. 267–276.
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l2. a feature, property belonging to descriptive sentences or to logical judg-
ments expressing them,
being the carriers of:
a. of negation of cognition, or
b. of falsifying cognition;
l3. the whole of sentences (judgments) being carriers:
a. of negation of cognition, or
b. of falsifying cognition;
l4. opposing cognitive-ethical values, anti-values;
l5. pseudoscientiﬁc “truth”;
l6. a pragmatic lie.
In the cases of l1. a/b, the lie is an existing object perceived as one
composed of all concrete lies, when the case
a. of untruth (contradictions of partial truths, concrete facts) is concerned,
and when it comes to the case
b. what is perceived in concrete behaviours or communication-related ac-
tions, in which we come, or we came, to deal with lying about a certain
state of things s, that is with a conscious formulation by the sender
of a determined act (or acts) of communication, in a determined si-
tuation, of an utterance whose aim is to mislead the receiver and to
lead the latter to interpret this utterance as one referring just to the
state of things s, with reference to which he himself – as the sen-
der of the utterance about s – is convinced that it does not hold,
that it is not a fact, therefore being sure that his utterance is false;
then, we say about such an utterance that it is mendacious, about its
sender – that he/she is a liar, that he/she is lying as regards case s,
about the state of things s – that it is the object of the lie, and about
the receiver of the mendacious utterance that he/she is one who is
lied to.
A lie in the sense l1.b can be meant to add colour to facts, to distort
and misinterpret the latter, to falsely create the reality. It is then connected
with falsifying the true cognition.
When the object of a lie in a communication-related action is a political
issue, we shall call the lie a political lie.
In the cases l1.a/b, the word “the lie” is used as a noun, like in the
following sentences:
a. That politicians always speak truth is a lie (an untruth).
That the crime perpetrated in Katyń is the responsibility of the Nazi is
a lie (an untruth).
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b. What is publicly stated, that is that the Katyń crime is the responsibility
of the Nazi is a lie.
What some historians claim, that is that Poles contributed to the out-
break of WW2 is a lie.
Political and historical lies provided in the last two examples are – at the
same time – concrete, veriﬁable untruths, concrete lies at the most general
conceiving of “the lie” as the whole of all untruths (the case l1.a). Untruths
in the sense of a, obviously, do not have to be lies in the sense of b, since
they do not have to be connected with lying to somebody. This is testiﬁed
to, at least, by the ﬁrst of the examples given above.
In the cases of l1.a/b it is also possible to use the word “lie” as an
operator, making use of certain expressions:
in the case of a, this can be: It is a lie (an untruth) that ...,
in the case of b, this can be: It is a lie what X stated while trying to convince
that ... .
In the cases of l2.a/b, the word “lie” is used in the adjectival function
and what is meant here is a feature, property of sentences (or judgments
corresponding to them), being the carriers:
in the case of a – of false cognition, and
in the case of b – of falsifying the cognition,
a feature consisting in their being:
in the case of a – untrue, false, and
in the case of b – mendacious.
Then, the word “lie” is replaced, in the case of a, with that of “falsity”,
and in the case of b – with the word “mendacity”. The adjectival usage of
the word “lie” can be encountered, for example, in the following utterances:
a. The sentence, “Politicians always tell the truth” is false (untrue),
b. The sentence, “The Nazi are responsible for the crime perpetrated in
Katyń” is mendacious.
The lie conceived in the way like in the case of l2.a (as falsity, false-
hood) is then a logical semantic notion. The falsity of a sentence, similarly
as the truthfulness of a sentence is an objective property: its possession or
the lack of possession of it depends only on whether between it (resp. what
it expresses, the judgment) and what it describes – the respective state of
things – there holds the Aristotelian agreement. Thus, the falsity of the
sentence does not depend on the time, place of circumstances, situation of
its uttering. Neither is it conditioned by any criteria.
A sentence is false if and only if it is not so as it claims.
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A contradiction of the lie (falsity, falsehood) is then the truth (truthful-
ness).
The lie conceived in the way like in the case of l2.b (as mendacity) be-
comes relativized to the following: the subject of the lie (the liar, the sender
of mendacious messages), the one who is being lied to (the receiver of the
mendacious messages), the mendacious utterance of the sender, and – ob-
viously – the communication situation in which this utterance is formulated.
The mendacity of a sentence (judgment) is not then its objective property.
Whether or not the utterance intermediating between its sender and the
receiver in the verbal communication is mendacious depends on sincere and
insincere intentions of its sender.
The lie in the case of l3.a is conceived as a whole of untrue, false sen-
tences, thus the whole of carriers of untruths. Each of such false sentences is
then treated as a concrete lie. The lie in the case of l3.b is a diﬀerent thing:
it is the whole of mendacious sentences connected with communication-re-
lated behaviour consisting in lying to somebody about a certain issue. Each
of such sentences is then treated as a concrete lie. For example, a concrete
Katyń lie is not what is publicly stated about the Katyń crime, but the very
sentence itself which is announced publicly:
“The crime of Katyń was committed by the Nazi.”
The lie, as a cognitive-ethical anti-value (the case of l4.) – in relation to
conceiving ‘the truth’ as a supreme cognitive-ethical value (the case of t4.)
– is connected with the use of the word “lie” to denote what is bad, wrong,
unworthy of human existence, what should never be the goal of an action,
what is usually an axiological negative value, what is not the aim of true
cognition, what is not the source of knowledge about the world, does not
aim towards the objective truth or spreading true sentences about the world.
The axiological qualiﬁcation of the lie depends on the motives which control
it, on distinguished axiological criteria. In politics and rhetoric, neither the
truth nor the lie are objective logical values.
In a similar way as one often speaks about various truths, one can speak
about various lies in the area of sciences, which are to replace these truths,
about pseudoscientiﬁc “truths” (the case of l5.) that are sets of menda-
cious, pseudoscientiﬁc theses (sentences) founded on unreliable arguments,
on false or mendacious assumptions, on premises that are often unsubstan-
tial, most frequently shorn oﬀ their primary meaning. Mendacious theses
are formulated and justiﬁed for some utilitarian purposes and are related to
assigning relative value to the truth. They were and are applied in politics
with the aim to manipulate, with regard to shape given views, ideas, Welt-
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anschauungs, ideologies, although – certainly – they are used not only for
such purposes.
Mendacious theses are ones of pragmatic value, which can determine
a pragmatic lie itself, that is the lie in the framework of l6. The lie in this
sense is always conditioned by some criteria of usability determined by an
established purpose of communication-oriented action, criteria connected
with eﬀective lying. The lie in the sense of l6. is thus of a relative cha-
racter and consists of mendacious sentences – relative lies functioning in
communication-related behaviours and established by given pragmatic cri-
teria. The notion of the pragmatic lie can be – with the framework given
here – considered subordinate in relation to the notion of the lie in the sense
of l3.b. The political lie, whose aim is, after all, to prevent an unfriendly
political situation, can be conceived as a kind of pragmatic lie.
3. Does the lie contradict the truth?
Undertaking, in this work, to discuss the diﬃcult problemate of the
truth and the lie, we cannot but separate the notions of the lie and the
truth from each other, as well as – even the more so – endeavour to answer
the question posed above. It is obvious that trying to answer this question
we should not connect the notions of the lie and the truth, which refer
to diﬀerent categorical beings, with each other. But even eliminating such
juxtapositions, the question asked here is ambiguous, since it may be rela-
tivized to diﬀerent notions of ln and tn, with n = 1, 2, ..., 6. In addition,
answers to questions already suitably relativized may not be unambiguous,
since we do not know what meaning of the word “contradict” is meant in
the question: Does “contradict” mean “being in contradiction with some-
thing”? or Does it stand for “being in opposition to something”? Taking
no account of the latter diﬀerentiation, answers to the following question in
the aﬃrmative:
(?n) Does a lie in the sense of ln contradict a truth in the sense tn?
with n = 1, 2, ..., 6,
will determine the exclusion relation between the extensions of the notions
of ln and tn, whereas those in the negative – and they can be so in contrast to
popular beliefs – will determine the crossing relation between the extensions
of them.
“Moving from the bottom to the top of the list” and juxtaposing the
lie in the sense of l6. – as one composed of relative lies, with the truth in
142
Does the Lie Contradict the Truth?
the sense of t6. – as one composed of relative truths, we cannot exclude
the possibility that there exist (relative) lies which are (relative) truths,
accepted both by liars and those whom are lied to. One can again quote
here Goebbels’ statement:
“A lie that is repeated a thousand times becomes a truth.”
It has been proved psychologically that the liar usually starts to believe
in his lies which he repeats a number of times, acknowledging them to be
truths, and in the case of political rhetoric which is carried out in relation
to the receiver, the strategy of shaping the opinion makes the lie craftily
penetrate into his mind and by readjusting the appropriate course of reason-
ing favours acknowledgement of the lies passed to the one that is lied to as
truths.
One can also, undoubtedly, provide examples of concrete lies founded
on certain pragmatic criteria, which – according to some other criteria – are
relative truths. Illustrating, by means of graphs, problems relating to the
question (?6) with the aid of Fig. 1,
Fig. 1
we insert the negative answer to the question in the table below:
l t Does l
lie truth contradict t?
l6 t6 No
Then, juxtaposing, the lie in the sense of l5. – as “a new truth”,
a pseudoscientiﬁc one, composed of mendacious, pseudoscientiﬁc theses –
with the truth in the sense of t5 – as a scientiﬁc truth consisting of theses,
scientiﬁc laws, we cannot exclude the fact that there exist pseudoscienti-
ﬁc, mendacious theses, justiﬁed on the basis of doubtful premises which are
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scientiﬁc truths, too, justiﬁable on the basis of scientiﬁc criteria (mendacious
theses may turn out to be true or made probable on the basis of applied
scientiﬁc arguments). Illustrating these observations with the help of Fig. 2,
Fig. 2
we insert the negative answer to the question (?5) in the table below:
l t Does l
Lie truth contradict t?
l5 t5 No
The answer to question (?4) is not unambiguous. If, by the ethical or
cognitive value – as the truth in one of the possible meanings of the word
“truth”, we understand the whole of cognitive-ethical values attributed to
particular sentences that are objectively true (the whole of morally positive
values), and by the ethical or cognitive anti-value – conceived as the lie
in a certain meaning of the word “lie” – all of the cognitive-ethical values
attributed to particular mendacious sentences, then it will turn out that
certain ethical values of this kind are not always morally negative values
in sensu strictu, since they can happen to be among mendacious sentences
acquiring a positive value as they are evaluated to be morally good. After
all, it was already Plato who wrote:
A lie sometimes becomes the authority if it is necessary
for the good of citizens.
Some mendacious utterances are thus accepted when oﬀered by poli-
ticians, and we know only too well from life that not only by politicians.
Then, we invest them with the morally positive value (+). When, however,
we acknowledge that truth-telling is a principle in force in ethics, that all
kinds of the lie are something wrong, we invest all mendacious utterances
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with the morally negative value (–). The criteria of moral evaluations are
very much varied. It is they that the answer to question (?4) depends on.
Illustrating our considerations by means of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4,
Fig. 3 Fig. 4
we obtain an answer “No” which is shown in Fig. 3, and an answer “Yes”
illustrated in Fig. 4. Using a table, we can thus frame the answers to que-
stion (?4) in the following way:
l t Does l
the lie the truth contradict t?
l4 t4 Yes-No
Let us move on to the answer to question (?3). Since we have diﬀeren-
tiated two notions of the lie in the cases of l3.a and l3.b, we juxtapose each
of them with that of the truth in the sense of t3. The notion of the truth as
the whole of objectively true sentences (t3) is contradictory, thus it excludes
that of the lie in the sense of l3.a, as the whole of untrue, false sentences
(see Fig. 5). However, this notion crosses that of the lie in the sense of l3.b
conceived as the whole of mendacious sentences, because the liar – against
his own intentions – by lying to somebody can utter a true sentence, being
convinced that it is false. Mendacious sentences can at times be objectively
true. The liar, while lying, can be telling the truth, utter a true sentence24
(see Fig. 6). Mendacious sentences – torn out of their context – can be ambi-
guous, at the same time, vague, insinuating, allowing various interpretations
of them and investing them with diﬀerent logical values: truth or falsehood.
They do not have to be logical sentences.
24 See: Wójcik, A. (2002).
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Fig. 5 Fig. 6
Thus, there are two answers to question (?3). They are included in the table
below:
l t Does l
the lie the truth contradict t?
l3.a/b t3 Yes/No
Let us move on to the answer to question (?2). Since the notion of
the truth in the sense of t2. – as a feature of objectively true sentences –
is juxtaposed here with the notions of the lie – as a feature of objectively
untrue sentences, false ones (the case of l2.a) and then with the notion of
the lie – as a feature of mendacious sentences – it is obvious that we will
obtain two answers. It is easy to notice that the feature of truthfulness of
the sentence is contradictory to the feature of falseness (no true sentence
can be at the same time false and each logical sentence is either true or
false /see Fig. 5/). Taking into account the case of l2.a, the answer to que-
stion (?2) is in aﬃrmative. Let us note that also in the second case – l2.b
– the answer is aﬃrmative, as the features of truthfulness and mendacious-
ness are opposing ones: the feature of mendaciousness is a subjective one
depending on the intention of the sender of the verbal message. It is appro-
priate for sentences which are false – in the intention of the sender (although
they may be true), while the feature of truthfulness is an objective one and
belongs to objectively true sentences, independent of what anybody thinks
about, or is convinced of the truthfulness of this sentence. Juxtaposing the
answers to question (?2) in the table, we obtain:
l t Does l
the lie the truth contradict t?
l2.a/b t3 Yes/Yes
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Now, it remains to answer question (?1). Let us consider, ﬁrst, the
situation when the objective truth, as a set of all facts, states of things that
hold (described by true sentences) which we discover – as partial truths – in
the “inﬁnite eﬀort o mankind”, is juxtaposed with the notion of the lie in
the sense of l1.a – as everything that is not a (partial) truth, everything that
consists of untruths, states of things that do not take place. In this case,
between the extensions of the notions: the lie (in the sense of l1.a) and the
truth (in the sense of t1) there occurs a contradiction relation (see Fig. 7).
Then, we should rather not say that the person who is telling untruth (a false
sentence) is lying, but that the person in telling untruth. As a matter of fact,
one can, even in a conscious way, be telling untruth (e.g. in jest) but is not
lying at all.
When we consider the notion of the lie in the sense of l1.b – as everything
that is the subject of mendacious utterances which are carriers of falsifying
the cognition (and may, though they do not have to refer to untruths, to
states of things that have not taken place, when such utterances – against
the liar’s intentions – are true), then it needs observing that objects (states
of things) which are objects of reference of the liar’s insincere statements
are “de-objectivized”, state of things as objects of cognition shorn of ob-
jectivism, since they are based on the liar’s internal beliefs that the states
of things which he is spreading around do not take place. Therefore, they
cannot be state of things, partial truths or untruths referred to in logical
sentences – objectively true or false. Thus, the extensions of the notions: the
lie in the basic sense (l1.b) and the truth as the object of a true cognition (t1)
oppose each other (see Fig. 8).
Fig. 7 Fig. 8
Juxtaposing the results of the considerations carried out above with
reference to (?1) we have:
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l t Does l
the lie The truth contradict t?
l1.a/b t1 Yes/Yes
A global juxtaposition of all of the inquiries into answers concerning
the question posed in this work is presented in the table below:
l t Does l







Thus, there is no unambiguous answer to the question posed in the
work:
Does the lie contradict the truth?,
and the negative answers to its variants: the questions (?4), (?5) and (?6),
manifesting in the last rows of the global table, can indeed be disturbing,
since these answers violate certain ethical principles which are binding –
primarily – in science, whose aim is searching for the objective truth (in
the sense of (t1)), as well as accumulation and systematization of partial
truths. The truth can be attained only through “pure” cognition, devoid of
utilitarian goals. Scientiﬁc truths ought to be founded on reliable, logical
arguments or well-veriﬁed hypotheses. There should be no room for any lies
and acceptance of pseudoscientiﬁc theses in science.
And what should it be like in other spheres of life? In politics? Has
anything changed since the times of Athenian democracy? The widespread
hypocrisy which prevents any reliable communication has become a constant
accompaniment of our contemporary life, and the very ethical postulate
itself “do not lie” is beginning to sound quite anachronistic, the causes of
which can be seen while endeavouring to answer the following question in
the negative:
Is ﬁghting with the lie more diﬃcult today than it used to be in the past?
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Answering this question, we can base on our own observations. From the
perspective of my own experience – as a participant of the political life and
events of the past ﬁfty years – I would like to share some of my reﬂexions
which the above question raises and I would also like to present a handful
of my own ideas.
4. Is it easier to lie nowadays than it was in the past?
The title of this part of the work is borrowed from the short treatise
written by Tadeusz Czeżowski in 1943.25 The word “nowadays” is an occa-
sional one. Its meaning changes in dependence on the context of its usage,
time and circumstances.
Over half a century has passed since the treatise was published. T. Cze-
żowski gave an aﬃrmative answer to the question posed in his work, justify-
ing his choice with the following reasons:
• the inseparability of language and the reality has been violated
(in the realism of the ancient philosophical thought a faithful reﬂection of
the objective reality was found in words),
• the object of cognition has been de-objectivized, a subjectivistic con-
ceiving of the world has been noticed
(creation of the image of the world as the basis of an eﬀective action, a visible
tendency in compliance with the pragmatic conceiving of the truth),
• the foundations of the negative moral qualiﬁcation of the lie have
changed, one of the motives of which is disturbance of social relations,
which was already emphasized by Kant
(moral evaluation of the lie is losing its acuteness within society due to
justifying the aims which it serves; this causes traditional sanctions aimed
against the lie to become very lenient).
An aﬃrmative answer to the question asked in the heading above – in
this context – speaks for itself in a peculiar sense as there arise the following
questions: Is the sense of it the same today as it was in the past?, and Has
it been so in the past ﬁfty years? We should then make a slight reference
to the aﬃrmative answer to this question in the post-war years, in the time
of ‘real socialism’, when – in defence of the lie – a whole system of political
lies was constructed, lies which were connected with the sphere of views and
which resulted from the following factors:26
25 See: Czeżowski, T. (1958).
26 See: Wierzbicki, P. (1986, 1987).
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1. annulment of the language,
2. annulment of logic,
3. annulment of reality,
and thus from factors connected with:
1’. tearing the language away from the reality,
2’. justifying mendacious theses without any logical argumentation, and
3’. creating new, false reality.
Having at its disposal hosts of defenders of those lies and forgers of
the truth, as well as a whole arsenal of tricks and manners of telling lies,
known already to ancient Greeks, and also the methods applied by masters
of lying of the interwar period and the methods of political rhetoric of
post-war non-communist states, the moral evaluation of the lie was losing,
and almost completely lost, its acuteness, imperceptibly creating, in society
– through imposition of a peculiar obligation – a belief in the truthfulness
or probability of the streams of lies that were passed and repeated. This
also changed the society’s attitude towards the lie as an unethical value,
one that was supported by slogans propagating relativity of the truth and
the “scientiﬁc” nature of the mendacious theses which were disseminated.
The New Speech, connected with the propaganda of the 20th century and
the functioning in it of two totalitarian state systems, did play an important
role in deforming societies’ consciousness, in not condemning the lie, or even
– in the acceptance of the lie as a “new truth”.
Times have changed. Political systems have changed in many countries.
The factors diﬀerentiated by Tadeusz Czeżowski, those favouring the lie
and the principle “It is worth lying”, are becoming readily augmented by
‘mediatization’ of politics and social communication. Such mediatization
allows fairly faithful presentation of politics, but also propagating untruths;
it allows – as we often put it – missing the truth, or contradicting it. Today,
society tells “the truth” or “the untruth” with the help of its media.
Philosophy is a friend to wisdom. But: Is it also a friend to the “wisdom”
that is often hidden in a political lie? Is a commonly repeated lie, frequently
accepted by society as “a new truth”, bound to constitute any value in the
times to come, when public and social mendacity grows to attain the status
of a new life principle?
This “new truth” is materializing within the thinking process in a com-
munity, in which the direction of thinking is not determined by logic, but
by some emotional factors. If there is a lack of good will and willingness
to learn the truth, then working out new ways of acceptance of authentic
political or historical events is a hard task. What is, then, the task set to
philosophy in the service of politics?
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A philosophical reﬂexion on the sphere of inﬂuences and interface of
various political subjects is connected with shaping of political and logical
culture, as well as with the level of it in contemporary society and among
the very politicians themselves.
Entering the area of problems relating to political ethics and social
ethics, it needs underlining that ﬁght for power is also a ﬁght for the
truth, the objective truth. Such a truth cannot be defenceless in the face
of the lie, especially those political and historical ones, it must defend itself
against deceptive arguments, against being deluded into lying. The truth –
as people say – will always out. Yet it will not defend itself only because it
is the truth. It must be a result of the process of reliable searching for it,
discovering it, justifying it, thorough understanding of it, and then – passing
and absorbing it.
Philosophy occupies a central place among sciences. “By making the
very truth itself the subject of its studies, by lighting up paths leading to it,
by creating the theory of scientiﬁc cognition, philosophy becomes an ally and
guide to all who – in any ﬁeld of human study – aim towards the truth,”
Kazimierz Twardowski – the founder of the famous Lvov-Warsaw School
mentioned earlier – wrote.27
It is time the appropriate study standards of philosophy – this lover
of wisdom and truth – returned and stood up to the “dubious forces” that
prevent the studies from being conducted.
One of the basic tasks to carry out by philosophy today is:
To serve the truth in politics.
It is a particular challenge and it requires engagement on the part of
many philosophers who – while analyzing diﬀerent problems pertaining to
political philosophy, come closer to the new perception not only of its prob-
lems, but also of the very world of politics itself, exerting an inﬂuence on
working out a sense of responsibility for the high level of public life. This
task requires delineating new routes for philosophy of politics, which will
allow developing a high political and logical culture in society – the culture
which guards intellectual work related to shaping views orWeltanschauungs,
as well as allows a critical analysis of the already accepted views.
27 Twardowski, K. (1933).
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S U M M A R Y
The paper deals with one of the most diﬃcult and worrying philosophi-
cal problems, that is the problemate of the truth and the lie. First,
certain analyses are made with reference to notions related to attempts at
answering the questions: What is the truth? And What is the lie?, then
– taking into account problems pertaining to political and social ethics
– various notions of the truth and of the lie are juxtaposed, respectively,
in such a way as to be able to answer the basic question raised in this
work: Does the lie contradict the truth? Answers to this question are not
unambiguous. In the author’s opinion, this presents a peculiar challenge
to philosophy, and – in particular – to philosophy of politics, as well as to
the idea of shaping the culture of politics and logic in our society.
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